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ABSTRACT 
 
AHMED ELMAHDI: Catalan Nationalism: A Shift from Civic to Ethnic  
(Under the direction of Leisbet Hooghe) 
 
 
Has the nationalist culture of Catalonia begun to move in the direction of ethnic 
exclusivity? As a region with a population harboring strong nationalist attitudes, Catalonia is 
among a unique brand of nationalism which elevates civic participation above ethnic lineage. 
This thesis will explore whether Catalan identity is truly inclusive and whether it has shifted 
towards the exclusionary ethnic brand of nationalism in response to political and economic 
crisis. 
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Introduction 
In the central-north of Barcelona sits the famous Gracia district. Predominantly a 
residential area, it is a world away from the bright lights and resort hotels along the city’s 
downtown coastline. Its slower paced atmosphere and relatively cheaper cost of living than 
the tourist trap destinations in El Born or El Gotico, make it an attractive local for families, 
artists and creative types. Its working class and middle class population make it a hub of 
political activity. From south to north the medieval churches and architecture gradually 
morph into cramped apartment buildings displaying Catalonia’s red and yellow or red, 
yellow and blue national flags; often draped from Victorian era balconies. In the barris of 
Barcelona one observes a contradiction of culture made noticeable by conservatism founded 
on Catholic social principle juxtaposed alongside an independent spirit fostered by a long 
history of self sufficiency. Catalonia and the Basque Country (El Pais Vasco) are the most 
independent of Spain’s twenty-two autonomous regions. These two regions are unique in 
their respective national identities which have had repercussions for society at large. 
Everything from public attitudes on immigration to regional government interaction with the 
Spanish central government is affected by the construction of national identities. Basque 
national identity is of course founded on the premise that citizenship in the Basque nation is 
ascribed depending on one’s ethnic lineage. In contrast, Catalan national identity is based on 
civic engagement criteria; the most important being functional ability in the Catalan 
language. It is assumed by many that Catalan civic nationalism is more fluid than the very 
rigid Basque ethnic nationalism precisely because it gives immigrants to Catalonia a straight
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forward path toward assimilation through civic engagement. This thesis will seek to answer 
the question what are the roots of persistent Catalan nationalism, and in particular, of the 
persistent civic nature of Catalan nationaim. I will ask the question of whether Catalan 
nationalism can be considered civic in the first place given some of the anti-immigrant 
elements in the Catalan nationalist movement today. Before the issue of nationalism can be 
tackled Catalan nationalism must first be dissected. Catalan nationalism will be treated as an 
ideology and as a political movement, respectively. I will therefore look into the civic and 
ethnic aspects of both; providing real world manifestations of each to illustrate any shift from 
a more inclusive civic to a more exclusive ethnic form of nationalism. 
 
CiU and Contemporary Politics in Catalonia 
 On November 26
th
 of 2012 political analysts and pundits were stumped by what they 
thought would be a confirmation of the predictions they had been making for months prior to 
this date. Catalonia’s parliamentary elections took place the day prior on the 25th and political 
parties running on a platform of patriotism and Catalan independence were projected to win a 
majority in the Generalitat de Catalunya. For the most part political analysts were correct in 
their assessment that the Convergencia i Unio or Convergence and Union party, the most 
dominant political party in Catalonia’s parliament, would win the majority of seats. What 
was unexpected was the amount of seats lost by the CiU from the previous election. During 
the two year period beginning in 2010 and ending in 2012 the CiU enjoyed a 62 seat majority 
out of 135 seats in the Generalitat. The parliamentary elections of 2012 gave CiU another 
majority but the difference this time was their loss of twelve parliamentary seats 
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(Electionresources). Analysts had expected CiU’s representation to dramatically increase 
from the previous election. And so the question remains; why the opposite affect? 
 
Figure 1.1 
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Figure 1.2 
 
 As Spain transitioned from a totalitarian state under Franco to a democratic system 
CiU arose as one of the first mainstream Catalan parties in the country. The party began as a 
coalition of two smaller parties; Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and the 
Democratic Union of Catalonia (UCD). The CDC was primarily a socialist party with a 
history of being staunchly on the side of Catalan autonomy. In the period following the death 
of Franco there was an upsurge of nationalism in Catalonia. Polling trends showed that voters 
favored parties with a strong pro-Catalan platform (Balcells, 177). In this respect the CDC 
was in prime position to take advantage of the upswing in nationalist sentiment but it 
couldn’t capitalize due to its attachments to Spanish socialists. By toning down its pro-
socialist rhetoric and forming an alliance between the UCD and CDC the CiU was able to 
carve a political space for itself and become the mainstream political party in Catalonia’s 
parliament. The CiU toed a moderate line between right and left that catered to Catholic 
conservatism on the right while taking care not to alienate the majority of Catalans who are 
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suspicious of political forces resembling the fascist Franco dictatorship they had lived under 
for so many decades. 
 The Catalan political arena provides several alternatives to the center right CiU. 
Esquerra Republica de Catalonya or ERC is one of the premier left-wing parties competing 
for the nationalist vote. In the 1970’s ERC was willing to form an alliance with two other 
left-wing parties, the PSC and the PSUC (Balcells, 184). In the elections of 2012 ERC’s 
share of the vote was 13.7 percent, a 6.7 percent increase from the elections of 2010 and an 
increase from the vote this party has received in previous elections. The ERC’s base 
constituency is comprised of ultranationalists; increasingly brining them into competition 
with parties on the far end of the left-right spectrum. In 2003 the ERC formed a coalition 
with the socialist PSC; upsetting some of its base voters who viewed PSC as insufficiently 
pro-Catalan (Pericay Coll, 2012). The far left Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP) and even 
the radical right wing Reagrupament (RI) have worked to gain a greater share of this voting 
block by increasing the level of nationalist rhetoric. Hard-line nationalists have yet to 
interrupt the dominance of CiU and PSC. However, as illustrated by ERC’s gains at the 
expense of those parties in the 2012 parliamentary elections, there is a space for parties that 
are unwaveringly on the side of Catalan autonomy.  
While most agree Catalonia should have the right to self determination, parties differ 
on other matters such as labor policy. Today parties with strong ties to labor unions are 
charged with subservience to the central government in Madrid. Their close ties to national 
socialists made the Catalan Socialist Party (PSC) a prime target for accusations of attempting 
to derail the movement for independence (Balcells, 172-76). The PSC and even its Spanish 
socialist counterparts were popular in Catalonia precisely because of their resistance to 
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corporatist powers in Madrid. Like the workers unions and socialists, corporate interests in 
Catalonia were well integrated with wealthy Spanish business owners. As it became clear 
that the Franco dictatorship was coming to an end, upper class Spaniards and Catalans began 
to fear that socialists and communists would capture the central government. Wealthy 
Catalans were especially frightened by the prospect of labor unions from various sectors of 
the Catalan economy forming a single unified labor organization independent of Spanish 
labor (Balcells, 176). PSC represented the specter of socialism to the upper class in Catalonia 
and so the powerful mobilized against it. CiU provided a safe political party to support 
although there remained concerns with CiU’s pro-independence stances. 
 
Sources of Nationalism 
 Put simply, nationalism is a state in which group identity becomes highly entrenched; 
creating rigid separation between populations and as a result establishing in-groups as well as 
out-groups within society. Nationalism can come in different forms depending on the history, 
culture and national context it takes place in. Regional nationalism like that of Catalonia and 
the Basque Country has the added aspect of a local culture that is different from and at times 
at odds with that of the larger state of Spain. Sociologists and political scientists often rely on 
social identity theory to get at the root of nationalism. The premise behind social identity 
theory is that individuals have a positive perception of the group they belong to (Ceobanu 
and Escandell, 2009). This positive association with one’s group has led some to theorize that 
individuals can in turn develop a superiority complex reliant on viewing members of other 
groups as inferior. Some social scientists differentiate between nationalism that is “civic” and 
nationalism that is “ethnic”. Civic nationalism would exist in a society in which membership 
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in the nation hinges on ones civic participation. Ethnic nationalism on the other hand is based 
on one’s genetic makeup and, theoretically at least, is much more exclusive than civic 
nationalism (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2009). It is difficult to find a specific case of 
nationalism which is either only civic or only ethnic so these conceptualizations of 
nationalism can only help us to categorize it to a certain extent. It can be argued that civic 
and ethnic identities tend to overlap. It is therefore difficult to categorize Basque or Catalan 
nationalism as purely ethnic or purely civic. 
 
Historical Foundations of Nationalism 
 As a geographical region, with its mountains and Mediterranean coastline, Catalonia 
has provided a contrast to the flat lands of central Spain. Not only has Catalonia provided a 
geographical opposite to Castil-La Mancha (central Spain) but it has also provided an entire 
cultural and economic opposite to it. Trade has historically kept the relationship between 
Spain and Catalonia a competitive yet cordial one due to the mutual benefit each receives 
from the others economic strengths. Unlike the Spanish Empire, whose great wealth was 
accumulated through conquest in Europe and the Americas, Catalonia built its wealth 
through a robust trade network; taking advantage of Mediterranean shipping routes and 
exchanging goods throughout Southern Europe and North Africa. Historical accounts suggest 
that a society has occupied what is modern day Catalonia from at least 600 B.C. with the 
establishment of the Greek city of Empuries (McRoberts, 9-15). Long periods of invasion 
and occupation marked the earliest recorded history of Catalonia with Roman and Visigoth 
invaders leaving the most noticeable marks on Catalan culture. The Romans invaded and 
occupied Catalonia beginning in 218 B.C. and for a short time making it the seat of the 
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Roman Empire (McRoberts, 9). After the collapse of the Roman Empire the Visigoths ruled 
Catalonia until the beginning of the eighth century. Like much of Spain, Catalonia was 
invaded by Moors from Andalusia who were expelled by Charlemagne at the beginning of 
the ninth century.  
For its protection from further invasion Catalonia relied on the Frankish Empire ruled 
by the Carolingian dynasty under Louis, son of Charlemagne (Balcells, 3). Due to the decline 
of the Frankish Empire several feudal territories formed the nucleus of what is Catalonia 
today. This historical period is particularly important to nationalists because they consider it 
to be the point at which Catalonia as a nation first formed. In 985 A.D. Catalonia was once 
again invaded by the Moorish Muslims who succeeded in sacking Barcelona (McRoberts, 9-
10). Count Wilfred the Hairy, who succeeded in uniting several of the feudal territories 
developed by the Franks (known commonly as the Hispanic March) to buffer themselves 
from the Moorish caliphate in the South, abolished Catalonia’s subordinate status under the 
Franks when it became clear that the Franks were no longer capable of providing Catalonia 
with protection. Nationalists claim Wilfred the Hairy’s unification of sections of the Hispanic 
March as the official birth of Catalonia. This is somewhat inaccurate due to the name 
“Catalonia” being used two hundred years later. Catalan as a language, however, has a much 
longer history; developing during the period of Roman rule as Latin mixed with local 
languages. Language became a major export helping the young Catalan state to develop 
alliances with its neighboring powers.  
The development of a symbiotic relationship between Catalonia and the Kingdom of 
Aragon resulted in the Catalan language becoming the lingua-franca in the Kingdom of 
Aragon as well as Valencia and the Balearic Islands. It is interesting to note that even today 
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the flags of Aragon, Valencia and the Balearic Islands share the red and gold stripes of 
Catalonia. Some Catalan nationalists include these outlying regions as part of their vision of 
an independent Catalan nation. Of course this is an ambitious conception of a future 
independent state considering these outlying autonomous communities have their own 
national self image. In the state of Valencia for example the regional language, although 
almost identical to Catalan, is described by locals as Valencian. This suggests that 
Valencians view themselves as a distinct community separate from Catalonia or any other 
autonomous region for that matter. None the less, history shows that Catalonia was once 
comprised of these autonomous regions. The Kingdom of Aragon and Catalonia proper (or 
what was called Old Catalonia at the time) were unified through the marriage of nobles from 
both principalities. The Catalan-Aragon unification into one kingdom was ruled by a 
hereditary monarchy known as the House of Barcelona and to foreigners they were 
commonly referred to as the “Catalan Kings” (Balcells, 7).  
For the modern nationalist movement the Catalan-Aragon Kingdom is of particular 
importance because it marks the birth of a unique political tradition essential to modern 
Catalan national identity. As the process of unification was underway, Catalonia found itself 
in the dilemma of how to bring together different provinces into one kingdom. Feudal 
“earldoms” had developed during the period of Carolingian oversight which made Catalonia 
one of the first feudal systems in Europe and the first to develop something resembling a 
representative democratic system. The lords of the original Catalan principalities did not 
want to relinquish all of their power. To calm their fears a series of contractual agreements 
were developed between the principalities, feudal lords, commoners and king; giving citizens 
and nobles in the Catalan earldoms some say in how they were to be governed. The Catalan 
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Usatges was adopted before the Magna Carta making it the first document of its kind 
(Mcroberts, 9-11). In Catalonia it became the legal framework upon which other contracts 
were based. Its declaration of equality between “men of honor” (or burghers) and the feudal 
nobility sets the Catalan Usatges as a unique and innovative experiment in decentralizing 
power. The affect of a document outlining the limitations of power created pactisme, a 
culture of contractualism and a preference for expansion through negotiation rather than 
through violent conquest. The modern Generalitat grew out of the pactisme tradition as 
Catalan kings began forming councils to mediate between themselves and the general public.            
 
Spain under Franco 
 Recognition of regional identities has existed in various capacities in Spain for quite 
some time so it is a wonder that Catalonia has been the target of state oppression throughout 
its history. As an autonomous region today Catalonia boasts one of Spain’s most robust 
regional economies. Economic self sufficiency based on a strong industrial work force is 
partly to blame for some of this suspicion from central Spain. 
Precursor: From the de Rivera regime to short lived-democratic rule 
While the Franco dictatorship is remembered as a time of brutal repression, it is not 
the first instance in which the powers in central Spain have worked to stifle the nationalist 
ambitions of Catalonia. The military coup that resulted in the dictatorship of general Miguel 
Primo de Rivera was one such period in which official state policies were enacted 
specifically to curb Catalan nationalism. De Rivera came into power in 1923 as regionalist 
entities in Spain began to mobilize against the central government as well as the Spanish 
monarchy. De Rivera had a special attachment to Catalonia as he had previously acted as its 
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Captain General in the Spanish military. He had projected himself as a pro-regionalist and in 
doing so gained the support of regionalist throughout the various autonomous communities 
of Spain. In Catalonia his main benefactors were the Catalan bourgeoisie who were 
concerned less with greater autonomy as they were with the activities of the Catalan anarchist 
organization CNT (Balcells, 79-83). They expected that De Rivera would focus his energies 
on leftist dissidents and grant them relative freedom to govern as they pleased. Upon seizing 
power De Rivera outlawed public display of the Catalan nationalist flag along with 
implementing the infamous ban on the speaking of Catalan in public for the first time 
(Balcells, 85). The de Rivera dictatorship laid down the blueprint for suppressing the 
expansion of nationalism by first targeting workers unions along with other socializing 
institutions such as APEC (Association for the Protection of Teaching of Catalan). The 
Catalan bourgeoisie assisted and at times directly collaborated with the dictatorship in its 
efforts to eliminate any opposition to its power. The outcome of this unholy union of upper 
class Catalans and the military dictatorship was the banning of the CADCI (Autonomist 
Center of Shop Assistants and Industrial Employees); an organization formed in Barcelona 
focused on worker’s rights advocacy and development of education programs for 
manufacturing employees (Balcells, 52-52). 
For the powers in central Spain working tirelessly to take a regionally fragmented 
society and concentrate its resources into the center, the autonomous regional governments 
needed to be stripped of their political power. The Mancomunitat de Catalunya, the political 
organization formed by the first Catalan kings with the express purpose of uniting 
Catalonia’s four provincial communities and now functioning as a regional parliament 
comprised of one house, worried the de Rivera government greatly. Although it held no 
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political or economic power and only functioned as a way to strengthen Catalan national 
identity, de Rivera saw it as a threat that needed either to be subverted or eliminated. His fear 
was that a strengthened Catalan national identity would eventually lead to a Catalan Republic 
forming to the east of Spain. The ban on speaking Catalan along with the banning of public 
service organizations were in direct response to the Mancomunitat’s efforts to develop an 
inclusive identity transcending often divisive political affiliations. He began by first 
dissolving the regional councils in all of the antonymous communities of Spain, save that of 
the Basque Country. The Mancomunitat was reduced to a social organization under the 
supervision of a state appointed president before eventually being dissolved completely 
(Balcells, 83). Even the non-political domain of professional sports was adversely affected by 
the clash of Catalan and Spanish identity politics. The famed Barcelona Football Club was 
banned from professional competition as it was a rallying point for the expression of 
nationalist attitudes. Interestingly, another Barcelona football team, known today as Espanyol 
Football Club, was allowed to continue competing because of its affiliation with the Spanish 
crown. The upshot is that the de Rivera regime alienated its traditional ideological 
supporters—the Catalan bourgeoisie—from the central Spanish state.  
 The nation’s first experience with democracy came during the short lived Second 
Republic which lasted from 1931 to 1936. It was brought to an untimely end by the outbreak 
of the Spanish Civil War; resulting in the rise of one of the most influential rulers in modern 
Spanish history. Under the command of General Francisco Franco, Nationalist military rebels 
went to war with Republican forces fighting for a democratic representative government. The 
Spanish Civil War brought to the surface many of the issues that lay dormant for many years 
due to Spain’s regions achieving a relative level of autonomy from the central government. 
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Many Spaniards saw representative democracy as an ineffective means of maintaining a 
unified Spanish state as was proven by the failure of the Second Republic period. The 
instability of the democratic experiment caused divisions along class lines as well as regional 
lines. Upper class Spaniards tended to side with the Nationalists while lower class Spaniards 
would support the pro-democracy Republicans (Hamann, 19). Religion was also a topic of 
division. Even the Catholic Church, which plays such a strong role in the lives of Spaniards 
and others South Europeans, was debated. For this reason the forty year reign of Francisco 
Franco is a defining moment in the history of Spain. 
 
The Franco Regime 
 Nationalists and Republicans represented two sides of the Spanish citizenry. Conflict 
between the two sides caused class warfare in society between upper and lower class 
Spaniards. After defeating the Republican forces and seizing the government, Franco’s 
regime became wary of leftist elements in society and reacted by targeting and eliminating 
those they deemed as a threat to their power. Labor organizations became a prime target for 
the fascists. This was primarily in response to the labor movement’s support of the 
Republicans during the Civil War. Franco’s regime used anti-labor tactics such as imposing 
sanctions on the political activity of working-class organizations to put a check on any viable 
opposition growing out of the labor movement (Hamann, 19). This focus on limiting labors 
political activity was used in part to protect Spain’s upper-class elite from a populist labor 
movement spiraling into violent confrontations between rich and poor. The Franco 
dictatorship, which functioned as a classical authoritarian government, did allow for some 
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pluralism. As long as the varying political interests did not pose any opposition to Franco’s 
rule they were allowed some room for political maneuvering. 
 Franco’s focus on crushing labor inspired pro-democracy movements was somewhat 
in vein. Organized labor became a symbol of opposition to Spain’s fascist regime for the 
simple fact that they provided a contrast to the dictatorship. The attention paid by Franco to 
the labor movement had the unintended consequence of making organized labor the default 
venue for the expression of political disagreement. In the words of Seymour Lipset, 
  
“the more and longer-lasting the state repression, the more drastic the consequences. Where 
the right to combine in the labor market was severely restricted…the decision to act in 
politics was forced on trade unions. Whether they liked it or not, unions became political 
institutions; they had first to change the distribution of political power within the state before 
they could effectively exert power in the market” (Hamann, 20). 
 
Despite Franco’s efforts at breaking the back of working-class movements, organized labor 
became instrumental in pushing for democratic reform and bolstered the already existing 
nascent democracy (Hamann, 20). The struggle against state-imposed limitations on their 
freedom to participate in politics helped Spanish labor and trade unions forge strategies they 
would later use to secure their position among other forces in politics. Understanding the 
obstacles faced by Spain’s labor movement is vital in understanding how labor influenced 
economic policy in the post Franco era. 
 The relationship between labor and the state under Franco can best be understood by 
looking at the institutional structure within the government that dealt with labor issues. 
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General Franco’s policy when dealing with the working class was to entangle labor and other 
left leaning groups in a web of legal procedures and requirements meant to deter them from 
even attempting any explicit acts of dissidence. If the inconvenience of jumping through 
Franco’s hoops was not enough and labor organizers were to act outside of the law, the state 
would have the legal justification to crush a rebellion. Two institutions were created in order 
to govern the activities of organized labor during this time. The Labor Charter of 1938 and 
the Syndical Unity Act of 1940 established the Spanish Syndicate Organization 
(Organizacion Sindical or OS); a compulsory and unitary organization for workers and 
producers as part of a corporatist apparatus of the state (Hamann, 21). The Franco regime 
argued that a consolidated labor organization under the state would create harmony between 
workers, employers and the state. The reality however was much different. The OS had no 
role in wage negotiation or collective bargaining. What the OS did do is facilitate state 
control over organized labor. Rapid industrialization was one of the goals of the Franco 
regime. An organized corporatist mechanism like the OS was meant to maintain the 
protective economic policies of Franco by denying the influence of organized labor in 
increasing the cost of production through wage bargaining. Its stated purpose was to “know 
the problems of production” and to “represent” the interests of the employer to the 
government (Hamann, 22).  
Franco’s repression hit the labor movement hardest, but it also hit middle-class and 
bourgeoisie sections of society. Heavy handed treatment by Madrid drove what used to be 
outwardly expressed nationalist ambition underground, forcing Catalans to innovate new 
means of expressing themselves as a culturally distinct entity. Strangely the ban on the use of 
Catalan in public was not applied to Catalan in print. From the beginning of the ban in 1926 
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to 1930 the number of books in print rose by ten percent. The number of magazines in 
Catalan, some of which were published in Madrid, rose by a significant margin during this 
period. In a four year span Catalan daily newspapers increased from three to ten (Balcells, 
85). Suffice it to say print became an important medium of expression for an increasingly 
pressured intellectual class. It should however be noted that books and other Catalan 
literature were subject to review by the government before publication, consequently filtering 
out any pro-Catalan or anti-dictatorship sentiment.  
The de Rivera dictatorship and the successive Franco regime expected the outlawing 
of nationalist symbols to demoralize Catalans into submission to the state. Their tactics 
proved counterintuitive as traditional classist divisions became less effective in disorienting a 
unified movement for independence. The red and gold striped flag, a symbol of 
independence, had long been associated with leftists and to a certain extent communists. The 
ban resulted in the transcendence of the Catalan flag from being politically divisive to it 
becoming a symbol of unity independent of economic or political association. So the net 
effect of the two centralist authoritarian regimes—de Rivera and Franco—was the forging of 
a cross-class alliance around Catalan autonomy which has mitigated traditional class politics. 
Castilian writers, artists and intellectuals saw the crushing of nationalist expression in 
Catalonia as a danger to maintaining cohesion between the various autonomous communities 
of Spain. They feared that nationalism would morph into violent separatism in Catalonia as 
well as cause a retrenchment of regional identities in the other autonomous regions of Spain. 
Several initiatives were put forward by Spanish intellectuals in an effort to strengthen the 
cultural link between Catalans and their central Spanish counterparts. This lead to a 
manifesto which was signed by a number of notable literary figures stating their intention to 
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propagate the Catalan language (Balcells, 86). This consortium of writers created a national 
exhibition of Catalan literature at the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid in order to celebrate 
Catalonia’s contributions to Spanish culture. Gestures of unity such as this did well in 
conveying a message of peace to Catalans but as a means of providing self determination for 
them it did not prove very practical. The aggression shown toward Catalonia by the Franco 
regime proved to be overwhelming for the peace loving Spanish intellectual class. Franco 
saw thinkers and artists as a chief menace to his vision of a Spain governed by a strong 
centralized power. His remedy for these medaling intellectuals was to make them targets of 
new laws curtailing political activity. Franco struck down Catalonia’s statute of autonomy 
and replaced it with a retroactive law making it illegal to be or have been a member of any 
leftist or Republican party (McRoberts, 41).  
 
The Impact of Immigration between Spain and Catalonia on Catalan Nationalism    
 Immigration has neither led to an increase in exclusive identities nor has it led to a 
weakening of Catalan identity. This may be surprising because at face value the relationship 
between Spain and Catalonia appears to be an agitated one. Periods of political conflict, and 
at times violence, have marked much of the two nation’s mutual history so it is 
understandable that the outside world view them as adversaries. Moreover, while past central 
governments in Madrid have taken measures to curtail the expansion of Catalan autonomy, 
Catalonia has not retaliated with a similar measure. When speaking to a Spanish compatriot it 
is common for Catalans to switch from speaking in Catalan to Spanish. In academia, teachers 
and professors will respond to inquiries made to them in Spanish also in Spanish. Among 
academics of equal stature this practice of accommodating Spanish counterparts by switching 
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languages has become an informal part of academic culture (Keating, 136-138). Figure 2.1 
below shows that Spanish and Catalan identities are not mutually exclusive. Studies have 
shown that individuals born inside Catalonia tend to carry dual Spanish or other identities 
along with their Catalan identity, although there has been a trend showing a strengthening of 
Catalan identity over Spanish identity. 
 
Figure 2.1  
 
This particular time scale marks a shift from exclusive singular identities to inclusive 
multiple national identity as Spain began membership in the European Union in 1986. When 
we look at national identification of citizens with family ties outside of Catalonia during this 
same period (Figure 2.2) the results are similar. Identification as either Spanish or more 
Spanish than Catalan is prominent among immigrants born outside of Catalonia. This is 
unsurprising but when we look at first generation Catalans of non-Catalan descent 
identification with Spain is reduced greatly (Keating, 103-131). 
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Figure 2.2 
 
Nationalism can be a stimulant affecting perceptions on immigrants and immigration. 
This means that national identity often precedes notions on whether immigration is positive 
or negative. Social identity must first be formed before there can be a distinction between 
which is the in-group and which is the out-group. Ethnic competition theory attempts to 
explain the process in which an “other” is identified and judged by a nationalist group 
(Schneider, 2008). Competition between groups for finite resources is assumed to be the 
cause of animosity between groups. It is thus the underlying cause for members of a 
nationalist identity group to exhibit negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. 
These conclusions on how national identity is developed are based around the realistic group 
conflict theory which asserts that members of a particular group in essence are socialized into 
the attitudes and behaviors of the nation they belong to as a response to a “conflict of 
interest” with another competing group (Schneider, 2008). On an individual level it is saying 
that members of a social group will tend to reflect the values and attitudes of their group. 
Members of a group who enjoy a level of privilege or who have the most to lose from the 
threat of competition are most likely to express hostility toward the out-group whether that 
means immigrants or minority groups. 
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In research on perceived ethnic threat there are several factors used to determine who 
is most susceptible to anti-immigrant sentiment. As is stated above, ethnic competition theory 
suggests that members of an in-group who have the most to lose are the most likely to harbor 
negative opinions on immigration. Low skilled workers who feel threatened by what they 
perceive as cheap labor supplied by an equally low skilled immigrant labor force would as a 
result be likely to have an unfavorable outlook on immigration. Schneider lists three 
predictors that help us identify those most likely to have an unfavorable opinion of 
immigration; income, occupation and education (2008). Those at the lower end of the socio-
economic ladder are consequently more likely to express hostility toward the out-group than 
their more affluent and higher educated in-group counterparts. Hainmueller and Hiscox note 
that although low skilled workers have the most to fear from a low skilled immigrant 
workforce; they are the economic beneficiaries when it comes to high skilled immigrant 
labor (2007). To take it a step further some propose that in times of widespread economic 
instability individuals who do not fall under the bracket of at risk members of the in-group 
are likely to express similar anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). 
Along with differing stands on economic policy, the majority of Catalonia’s 
mainstream political parties promote some form of pro-Catalanism in their party platform. 
This is out of practicality as well as necessity because parties holding an anti-Catalan stance 
would most likely struggle to remain in existence. Regardless of their support for Catalanism 
parties were forced to attempt to outdo one another as they navigated a minefield of pro-
nationalist sentiment. The Partido Popular or PP, like many of its political adversaries, has 
maintained a level of support for Catalonia’s status as an autonomous community. What it 
did not support, however, was an eventual complete separation from the Spanish state. 
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According to a CIS voter opinion survey taken in 1992 the PP was identified by 31 percent of 
respondents as a party that they could never vote for (Keating, 133). By being the most 
outwardly pro-autonomy party CiU was able to capture a large chunk of voters turned off by 
the PP’s anti-independence stance as well as straddle both sides of the left right political 
spectrum with a broad appeal transcending economic class. CiU’s political ingenuity is not 
the only reason behind their success as much of it has to do with the Catalan penchant for 
centrism. As will be discussed in a later section, racist and bigoted pandering to far right 
voters has not proven an effective strategy for wide ranging political success. Nationalism in 
Catalonia may be strong but it diverges greatly from the sort of classic examples of popular 
nationalism such as that of National Socialist Germany. Hence, nationalism in Catalonia has 
primarily been inclusive rather than exclusionary, and based on civic commonality rather 
than ethnic ties. 
 
The impact of the economy 
 The independence movement today has much to do with the economic productivity of 
the region in the past. Catalonia’s economic prowess has afforded it some leverage in 
negotiating for greater independence from the government in Madrid but in some 
circumstances it has been a hindrance to developing closer ties between the two. The Europe 
wide credit crisis has added another layer of complication to this already complex 
relationship. The current European crisis is the product of an international downturn 
triggered by a real-estate collapse in the United States which then spread to other economies. 
While most of Europe has felt the consequences of the economic crisis; Spain, with what 
used to be a boom and now a bust in the real-estate market, was one of the most adversely 
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affected among European Union member states. For Catalonia market instability and 
austerity measures levied by powers outside of the region have resulted in wide spread 
dissatisfaction manifested in periodic labor strikes and mass demonstrations. As calls for 
independence have gained popularity politicians have stoked flames of discontent for their 
own political ends. The modern economic crisis is ongoing so a complete understanding of 
its full repercussions will not be known until much later. The current crisis is not the first 
time Catalonia has dealt with the side-effects of economic decline. Fortunately (or 
unfortunately) we can look to previous crises for some guidance.  
   Until the 1970’s and 80’s industrialization by and large seemed to tie Catalonia to 
the rest of Spain, thus undercutting an economic rationale for Catalan nationalism. Textile 
manufacturing was Catalonia’s earliest industrial sector to develop and among the first in 
Spain during the Industrial Revolution. Catalonia’s production flourished as raw material 
from Spanish and other European colonial properties flowed into Catalan ports to be 
processed into consumer goods. The textile industry relied on Spain’s domestic consumer 
market which later became the backbone of a diverse Catalan regional economy. It is 
important to note that the period of boom in textiles had little to do with international exports 
as protectionist policies kept products made in Catalonia inside of Spain; in effect making 
Catalonia dependent on the success of the greater Spanish economy. As former Spanish 
colonies in Latin America and Africa moved towards greater independence, the price of 
importing raw materials increased. The result was an economic downturn in all of Spain. 
Nonetheless industry continued to strive during the two World Wars which provided demand 
for goods formerly produced in other parts of Europe (Keating, 151).  
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Franco’s strategy of containment further increased Catalan dependence on capital 
investment from Spanish firms. When economic crisis hit the Catalan economy was not able 
to effectively cushion itself from the blow. In response, leaders in the autonomist movement 
searched for legal avenues for nation building. This happened at a time that nationalist social 
clubs and political parties were effectively shut down from public activity by the Spanish 
government; no longer making them a viable option for promoting the nationalist cause. Jordi 
Pujol who went on to become the first president of the reestablished Generalitat, along with 
other Catalan leaders, focused his attention on diverting Catalan industry toward reinforcing 
the regional economy. They expected that stronger networks among Catalan business elites 
would have the residual effect of granting political leaders more room to maneuver (Balcells, 
150). Formed in 1961, Banca Catalana was expected by Pujols and his cohorts to provide the 
capital investment needed to reinvigorate the stagnating regional economy. However, the 
failure of the bank during the 1980’s international recession triggered by the 1979 energy 
crisis meant that Banca Catalana would be under the stewardship of the Spanish Banco de 
Vizcaya.          
In the short term Banca Catalana’s failure was a major loss for Jordi Pujol. During the 
buildup to the 1984 Catalan elections Pujol was accused of engaging in corrupt practices as 
former head of Banca Catalana. Calls were made for his arrest and prosecution but the 
regional court of Barcelona found no grounds for pursuing a case against him. Accusations 
against Pujol later benefited him politically; making it appear as though their nationalist 
leader was the target of persecution by anti-Catalan forces. The controversy surrounding the 
banking collapse put the nationalist vote solidly in the corner of Jordi Pujol’s CiU. However, 
the PSC (Party of the Socialists of Catalonia), a coalition of the three main socialist parties, 
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moved away from the nationalist cause and began negatively associating it with Pujol, 
corruption and CiU. The result was a CiU majority in the Generalitat with Pujol at the helm 
of the presidency.    
The effect of Spain’s accession to the European Union in 1986 on Catalan 
nationalism was double-edged. On the one hand, it did create a dilemma for Catalan 
economic growth. Protectionist policies of Spain had historically shielded goods produced in 
Catalonia from having to compete with products made elsewhere. Workers had the added 
benefit of not having to compete with an influx of cheap labor from neighboring countries. 
As members of the European Common Market, Spain, and in turn Catalonia, were forced to 
compete in a globalized economy. For those in search of greater independence this was the 
opportunity to reverse decades of economic domination by Madrid. Years of dependence on 
the central government had retarded Catalonia’s technological advancement to the extent that 
competing within the European market directly would have only served to reinforce their 
subordinate position under the state. The Generalitat and others in the autonomy movement 
realized that internal investment in education and research were necessary in order to update 
an archaic technology sector and a labor force geared toward servicing Spain’s domestic 
market.           
On the other hand, integration into Europe brings with it limitations on the continued 
dissolution of Catalan national identity by Spain as Madrid surrenders some governmental 
authority to the European Community. The European Parliament in particular provides a 
stage upon which Catalans can voice their grievances with the central government; 
effectively putting pressure on Madrid from the outside. This does not mean the autonomous 
government of Catalonia somehow seeks to circumvent Spanish authority in the EU. On the 
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contrary, there is a history of collaboration between Catalonia and Spain on the European 
stage. One such example is the Patronat Catala Pro Europa, a public-private lobbying 
organization formed in 1982 to promote Catalan interests in Brussels as well as disseminate 
information about European accession within Catalonia; both in an effort to strengthen the 
Catalan position prior to Spanish accession into the EU (Keating, 157). Today this 
organization works with Spanish bureaucrats inside Brussels in order to enhance Spain’s 
position in negotiations.         
The European Union’s founding principles of peace through economic, political and 
cultural unity have helped autonomous and culturally distinct regions such as Catalonia, 
Basque Country, Scotland and Wales loosen the bind to their parent state. Further integration 
means that central governments will have to take Europe into consideration when dealing 
with autonomous communities. For Catalan culture, further integration brings the challenge 
of less insulation from cultures inside as well as outside of Europe. Balcells argues that 
European collective identity is very weak and disproportionately influenced by American 
film, fashion, music and other media (197-99). Catalonia along with other European 
territorial communities, he says, are treated as exotic while culture imported from across the 
Atlantic is treated as the norm. It is yet to be seen whether this will have a negative effect on 
Catalonia granted its potential for exporting its own culture.                              
 
Education and the segmented assimilation model 
 Education is less obvious as an indicator of pro or anti-immigrant sentiment. In 
Hainmueller and Hiscox’ study of education preference they find that the level of education 
achieved by in-group members is a telling predictor of their level of xenophobia or tendency 
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to be accepting of diversity. They find that more educated respondents to their study were 
accepting of other ethnic and cultural groups (2007). Education, although it is frequently a 
byproduct of socio-economic class, is the most important indicator because it gets to the 
heart of the issue of perception not necessarily leading reality in regard to attitudes toward 
immigration. Popular culture simplifies immigration as an economic threat to the in-group 
and presents it as a zero-sum game in which the economic status of in-group members is 
threatened by a foreign counterpart. Negative economic conditions are the most hospitable 
environment for this sort of xenophobic reactionary sentiment because it provides the most 
adversely affected with a convenient scapegoat; immigrants.  
Education along with housing, prospects for employment and opportunities within the 
welfare state are incentives for people to advance beyond the limitations of their native land. 
The segmented assimilation model is one of the main issues in dispute between those who 
are for multi-culturalism and those against it. Thomson and Crul would argue that second 
generation immigrant children who are raised in a household in which the immigrant culture 
is well pronounced are less likely to assimilate and thus be ill-equipped to deal with life in 
their adopted home (966). The fear they express is a fear of immigrants becoming an 
underclass that is doomed to experience long term isolation from economic and social 
mobility. Turkish immigrant to Europe, they argue, are one of the most difficult immigrant 
populations to integrate; the reason being closely held cultural traditions such as the 
expectation for young women to end their educational careers earlier than their male 
counterparts (Crul and Thompson, 974). Rightly they argue that the singularity of literature 
in the American context pays little attention to second generation females. As a result, they 
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say, women are adversely affected by the multi-cultural model leaving them particularly 
susceptible to falling into the underclass trap. 
Much of the research on attitudes about immigration holds high relevance to 
Catalonia, as Europe continues the process of further integrating the many regions and 
cultures it is comprised of. As was pointed to in the above section, continuation of foreign 
cultural practices in a host society often creates tension between native and immigrant 
populations. The hot topic in the study of immigration and nationalism has been the 
perceived rise of anti-immigrant sentiment across Europe; targeting specifically Arab and 
Islamic communities. Laws banning the ritual slaughter of animals in the Netherlands as well 
as the French ban on the wearing of veils in public settings fuel this speculative rise in anti-
foreigner sentiment. In Catalonia’s municipal elections of 2011 the far right PxC (Plataforma 
per Catalunya) made sizeable political gains running on a platform of stopping what they saw 
as an invasion by foreign Muslims. The PxC ran a campaign commercial showing three 
young women in mini-skirts in the Catalan municipality of Igualada skipping to the tune of 
Catalan folk music. The scene cuts and fades in with the caption “Igualada 2015” to three 
women in burkas skipping to Arabic music accompanied by the text “You can avoid this 
nightmare becoming reality”. The local Badalona branch of the Partido Popular adopted 
similar bigoted rhetoric during its campaign. To the great displeasure of the general PP, some 
of its members even distributed leaflets describing Romanians and “gypsies” as a plague 
(Feket). Anti-immigrant sentiment is normal for any society so isolated incidents such as 
these do not necessarily point to any great shift from inclusive civic to exclusive ethnic 
identity. Electoral success based on racist and exclusionary rhetoric has also been marginal. 
Economic crises do have a history of producing anti-immigrant attitudes in other parts of the 
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world. As far as Catalonia is concerned, we can only know for sure once the consequences of 
the current economic crisis are fully understood.                             
 
 Conclusion 
 This thesis set out to understand the sources of the persistent strength and civic 
content of Catalan nationalism. I have argued that Catalonia’s long history of autonomy 
combined with the mobilizing impact of the consecutive authoritarian governments of de 
Rivera and Franco have laid the basis for an enduring nationalism with broad crossclass roots 
in Catalan society. I have also shown that this particular history has helped to forge a 
predominantly civic national identity which continues to prevail despite the challenges of 
immigration and economic crisis. 
 Social scientists in the fields of nationalism and immigration studies are in a quandary 
because it is difficult to decide which one, nations or attitudes, precede and produce the 
other. Some would argue that an individual’s opinion of an outside group informs their 
decision to identify with the social group they belong to. Although nationalism is 
fundamentally exclusionary, the Catalan brand of nationalism cannot be categorized under 
the ethnic nationalism banner. A CIS survey done in 1996 asking whether respondents 
considered Catalonia to be a ‘nation’ or a ‘region’ showed 34 percent selecting ‘nation’ while 
59 percent chose ‘region’ (McRoberts, 164). This shows that there is a plurality of opinion on 
what Catalan national identity should look like outside of the simple reactionary anti-Spanish 
response. Catalan culture has always been cosmopolitan and in some ways there is an 
unconscious acknowledgment that openness to other people and cultures has helped to 
preserve it. Only time will tell if the current economic crisis will result in regressive 
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exclusionary identity politics. Worse circumstances have befallen Catalonia in the past and 
its culture of openness has persevered.     
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